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POPULARIZING THE PRECOLONIAL PAST: POLITICS AND PROBLEMS
John Wright
The importance of history as an ideological weapon hardly needs
stressing. It is a safe generalization that all political in-
terest-groups, whether dominant or dominated, invariably seek
to legitimize their particular policies and practices by seeking
precedents for them in the past. In the process they will,
if necessary, reshape and, if they can get away with it, invent
the past to suit their purposes. At the same time they will
be concerned to neutralize and, if possible, suppress or exorcize
that knowledge of the past which informs the political projects
of groups opposed to them. Control of the past is, in other
words, always a political issue, and history is always a terrain
of struggle.
In South Africa the political importance of history is graphically
illustrated by the development of Afrikaner nationalist historio-
graphy. It is also well recognized by those engaged in the
development and social rooting of what is coming to be called
People's Education. Thus among the subject committees appointed
by the National Education Crisis Committee last year was one
set up to develop an alternative to the official history syllabus
of the Department of Education and Training. And thus a Soweto
student involved in an informal education group could explain
that the group was concentrating initially on history 'because
it is the one subject through which the oppressor instilled
into the black people a sense of inferiority, barbarism and
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dependence' .
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The self-consciously 'alternative' kind of history which in
the last year or so has become widely known in South Africa
as People's History has its origins in the post-Soweto period
of the late 1970s. It has emerged essentially as anti-apartheid
history, i.e. as history written explicitly as a counter to
the racist arid elitist stereotypes and perversions of the southern
African past that have characterized the history propagated,
especially in the schools education system, by successive apart-
heid regimes. it is 'popular' history in that where apartheid
history seeks to minimize and demean the historical roles played
by the black people who form the great majority of South Africa's
population, People's History deliberately seeks to bring the
black underclasses into South African history, and at the same
time is written primarily for a readership drawn from those
classes.
The emergence of this genre of history in South Africa is some-
thing that should be greatly welcomed by academic historians,
and the expansion of its still exiguous literature a project
in which they could be playing a much more active role. Not
the least contribution that these historians can make is to
provide constructive criticism where it is needed. This paper
aims to set out a number of critical comments on one aspect
of the popular history that has emerged since about 1980 - its
treatment of the precolonial period of southern African history.
(By 'precolonial' is meant the period before the establishment
of effective colonial rule. Over most of southern Africa this
took place in the second half of the 19th century. ) Though
the approaches to the period exhibited in the popular literature
are by no means always uniform, certain features emerge frequently
enough in it to provide a focus for some generalized comments.
The most obvious feature of the way in which precolonial history
is 'presented in the popular literature is that, compared with
colonial and post-colonial history, it gets relatively little
attention. In large part this neglect is due quite simply to
the absence of readily available syntheses of southern Africa's
precolonial history. The academic study of the period by his-
3.
torians essentially began only in the 1960s, flourished briefly
in the 1970s, and then went into decline in the early 1980s
as the first generation of precolonial historians, together
with their students, moved on to what they felt were more 'rele-
vant1 fields of study. The result is that very large areas
of southern Africa's past before the mineral discoveries of
the late 19th century are still relatively unknown.
But (to anthropomorphize the more easily to generalize) another
reason for popular history's neglect of the precolonial period
has to do with the nature of the political paradigm in which
it is produced. As already indicated, it is a history that
has emerged very largely in response to apartheid history. The
directness of its engagement gives it, at its best, a great
cogency, but at the same time, even where its propositions are
diametrically opposed to those of apartheid history, tends to
lock it into the same frame of reference. Popular history,
in other words, has so far tended in many ways to emerge as
a reverse image of apartheid history, to define itself not so
much in terms of what it is proposing as in terms of what it
is opposing. Thus where apartheid history focusses primarily
on post-'great trek1 history, so does popular history, even
if, instead of highlighting the struggles and 'achievements'
of white settlers, and of Afrikaners in particular, it emphasizes
popular resistance to, and struggles against, colonialism and
apartheid. And as apartheid history pays little attention
to the history of precolonial African societies, so too has
popular history so far tended to do.
In so far as it does consider the precolonial period, popular
history highlights three main themes - the establishment of
Iron Age farming societies in the early AD era, the emergence
of large states in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and
resistance to the intrusions of white settlers. Otherwise the
period tends to be treated ethnographically rather than histori-
cally. As in apartheid history, descriptions of customs and
cultures of societies defined in the vocabulary of contemporary
orthodox anthropology - the 'Nguni', the 'Sotho', the 'Tsonga'-
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often substitute for explanations of historical continuities
and changes. The result, as in apartheid history, is the emer-
gence of a picture of timeless, unchanging societies. Even
if they are described in positive terms rather than in the nega-
tive terms of apartheid history, they do not emerge as having
a real history. Precolonial history thus functions essentially
to provide images of an idealized past which can be contrasted
with the miseries of life under colonialism and apartheid. The
restoration of a positive view of precolonial society should
be an important facet of popular history, but when the dynamic
element is left out the result is a stereotyping and therefore
a mystification of the past. The political implications of
this process will be touched on in the conclusion to this paper.
To put the argument in context, three features of a common stereo-
type which by and large remains unchallenged in popular histories
will here be discussed further.
In the first place, the stereotype assumes that precolonial
societies were politically united and socially homogeneous.
This view fails to take into account that states such as those
ruled by the Zulu, the Dlamini (Swazi), the Khumalo (Ndebele),
the Kwena (Sotho), the Maroteng (Pedi), and others were composed
largely of discrete chiefdoms which had been subordinated by,
or had given their allegiance to, a dominant chiefdom. The
nature of the relations between dominant and subordinate chiefdoms
varied widely, but in all these states political tensions between
the various chiefdoms provided one of the major dynamics for
historical change. Failure to appreciate this means that the
political history of these states ends up as the accounts of
dynastic struggles and wars with neighbours that are all too
familiar from 'colonial' literature.
This view also fails to take into account that in these states
there were clear social divisions between an exploitative aristo-
cracy which owned relatively large numbers of cattle and the
common people who owned relatively few. These embryonic class
divisions tended to co-incide with ethnic divisions. Thus in
the Zulu kingdom, the socially superior chiefdoms of the amantung-
wa category were distinguished on ethnic lines from socially
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inferior categories such as those of the amanhlwenga, amathonqa,
amalala, amazosha, and others. Similar class-cum-ethnic divisions
existed in the Swazi and Ndebele kingdoms, and were probably
widespread in African states.
To do it justice, some of the popular literature on precolonial
societies does take note of the existence of class divisions.
Invariably, though, it does so in an 'ethnographic descriptive'
rather than a 'historical explanatory1 context. Thus descriptions
of these societies will note that there were differences in
the social positions of rich and poor, powerholders and subjects,
aristocracies and commoners. But when it comes to explanations
of political change the role of class factors is largely dis-
regarded, and the reader tends to be left with various determinist
or even 'Great Man1 notions of change.
The stereotype also tends to take for granted the divisions
that existed in African societies on lines of sex and of age.
It does not consider that relations between men and women, and
between older people and younger, were sites of struggle, and
therefore cannot conceive of changes in gender relations and
in age-group relations such as took place with the rise and
later the collapse of states such as those mentioned above.
Nor can it find room for a history of the family, or of women.
In the second place, the stereotype tends to see African polities
as having been united in their struggles against the establishment
of white domination and colonial rule. This is a view which
derives largely from ideologies developed in the course of politi-
cal struggles in the late 19th and the 20th centuries. At many
times and places the struggle against colonialism did strengthen
unity within and between African societies, but at other times
and places it brought about disunity and political fragmentation.
The stereotype obscures the fact that in the precolonial period,
relations between Africans and whites were far more fluid and
flexible than they became in the 20th century, when they took
the form essentially of relations between a dominant boss class
and a subordinated worker class. It is a distortion of the
evidence to see Africans in the 19th century as all arranged
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together on one side of a frontier, with all whites on the other.
This view which is common to apartheid history and to anti-
apartheid popular history alike, gives no idea of the complexities
of cross-frontier political alliances, especially in the period
before the 1880s. In what is now the eastern Transvaal region,
whites sought alliances with black allies against other whites,
as well as against other blacks; and blacks sought alliances
with whites against other blacks, as well as against other whites.
Further south, the factions within the Zulu leadership frequently
sought to make alliances against their rivals with either the
Boers in the Transvaal or the British in Natal.
In the same vein, the point needs to be made that in probably
every war that white people have fought against black people
in southern Africa, they have had other blacks fighting on their
side. The British regulars who fought a long succession of
wars against Xhosa-speaking people in the 19th century were
invariably assisted by Xhosa-speaking and other black auxiliaries.
Natal Africans fought on the side of the British against the
Zulu in the war of 1879. Swazi soldiers played a major role
in the British defeat of the Pedi in that same year. Numerous
other examples could be cited. The various groups of people
who defined themselves as whites should be seen not as a homoge-
neous group of conquerors sweeping across the land but as intru-
sive communities, themselves often internally divided, that
intervened in, or were drawn into, pre-existing patterns of
political conflict. In the process, subordinate groups in African
polities often made alliances with white groups against the
established leadership. African politics in the 19th century
need to be seen in their own terms, not in terms of the very
different politics of the 20th century.
In the third place, the stereotype sees colonial rule as having
been imposed and maintained primarily by force. At a reductionist
level this is true: some of the most violent and destructive
wars in Africa's history were fought to establish European colo-
nial rule in the southern part of the continent, and the mainte-
nance of white domination in South Africa has always depended
on the use of violence against black people. But the stereotype
fails to take note of the articulation between precolonial and
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colonial forms of domination and exploitation. Colonial
administrators in southern Africa, as in the rest of Africa/
were not usually in a position to rule by force alone: they
often relied heavily on policies of divide and rule which took
advantage of pre-existing political and social cleavages within
African society. Thus they took advantage of succession disputes
to make alliances with one faction against another. They
exploited pre-existing forms of ethnic discrimination to split
subject groups off from rulers and to create out of them new
and often co-operative administrative 'tribes'. As is well
known, they very often did not assume direct authority over
their African subjects but ruled them through hierarchies of
'traditional' chiefs and sub-chiefs according to 'native law',
which was based partly on the impositions of the colonial admini-
strators, and partly on customary law as interpreted by the
collaborative collectivity of chiefs. They exploited pre-existing
gender divisions and patterns of female subordination in order
to thrust onto women the prime responsibility of maintaining
households whose basic structures were changing under the impact
of migrant labour and the penetration of market relations. They
exploited pre-existing age-hierarchies in order to try to keep
control over a migrant labour force composed largely of young
unmarried men.
One response to the comments made above might be to dismiss
them as academic, and as irrelevant - or, worse, divisive -
in the context of present-day popular struggles against apart-
heid. In answer to this kind of charge two points need to be
made. First, that for popular historians to neglect precolonial
history is to leave the field wide open for annexation by the
ideologues of ethnic nationalisms. In recent years ethnically
based political movements in southern Africa, particularly in
the bantustans but also in places like Swaziland, have moved
with varying degrees of effectiveness to seize on the precolonial
past in order to provide themselves with a mantle of legitimacy.
In the bantustans the clearest example of this is to be seen
in the way in which the leaders of the Inkatha movement have
for a decade and more manipulated Zulu 'traditional' history.
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The most effective exponent of the Inkatha version of history
is the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.
Throughout his political career. Chief Buthelezi has taken every
opportunity of publicly proclaiming a version of Zulu history
which focusses on the 19th century Zulu kings as the founders
and guardians of a unified Zulu nation and as the leaders of
a heroic resistance to the establishment of colonial domination.
In this view, the present-day Zulu royal house and its close
associates, including Chief Buthelezi, are, by virtue of their
genealogical and 'spiritual' links with the past kings, the
natural and therefore legitimate leaders of Zulu people today,
wherever they are to be found, and whatever their walks of life.
Lacking as he does a national political base, Chief Buthelezi
has successfully exploited a localized ethnic past to help provide
himself and Inkatha with a strong regional base.
The Inkatha version of history can be seen as 'popular' in that
it is produced primarily for consumption by a section of the
oppressed people of South Africa; but in that it focusses on
great men, and does not recognize a division of interests between
leaders and led among Zulu people either in the past or in the
present, it is in effect strongly elitist. It makes powerful
emotional appeals to working-class Zulu people, but it does
so by celebrating an imaginary unity of the Zulu 'nation' now
and in the past, and by recalling the military 'glories' of
the Zulu kingdom. It thus appeals to their 'Zulu-ness' rather
than to their common membership of a nationally oppressed and
exploited working class. It belongs to that brand of ideology
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which Stuart Hall has called 'authoritarian populism1, and,
because of its ethnic exclusivism, can be seen in the context
of South African national politics as a profoundly divisive
force. It seems hardly necessary to argue the case that popular-
democratic (to use Hall's term again) historians need to contest
it on its own terrain of precolonial history by bringing out
the role of the underclasses in the history of the Zulu kingdom;
and by revealing how Zulu ethnicity, like all ethnicities, was
not something primordial and fixed, but was created and con-
tinually refashioned - as it continues to be today - by sectional
political interests.
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Second, to downplay the existence of social and political
divisions within and between African societies in the precolonial
past is in effect to discount the importance of the struggles
in those societies of subordinate groups and of common people,
and to give . legitimacy to a view of history which highlights
the role of dominant groups. It is also to obscure the ways
in which, in the course of those struggles, ethnicities were
shaped and reshaped, and thus in effect to leave unchallenged
the enormously pervasive view that ethnic groups are not so
much products of history as part of the 'natural' order. On
both counts it is a partial surrender to apartheid history,
in that it is to accept elitism and ethnicism as largely unproble-
matic. It is to accept the terrain of struggle as apartheid
history defines it, instead of seeking to shift the site of
the struggle altogether. A genuinely People's History cannot
develop in South Africa until its exponents extend their concern
with issues of class and ethnic conflict in the more recent
past to include the precolonial period.
It is entirely appropriate - and necessary - that popular history
should take as its starting point the popular struggles being
waged against apartheid in the present. But if it is to be
history for liberation rather than history for continued oppres-
sion then it needs to recognize more clearly that these struggles
are in many ways shaped by forces that have their origins in
the precolonial period of southern Africa's history, and to
address itself to portraying the nature of those forces to its
readers.
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